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Reversing the Norm Effect on Causal Attributions1 





Research in the psychology of causal thinking has frequently revealed effects of normative 
considerations on causal attributions, where participants tend to assign causality more strongly to 
agents who violate a norm in bringing about an outcome. Across several experiments, we show 
that it is possible to reverse this norm effect when the outcome in question is good rather than 
bad: in these cases, participants assign causality more strongly to a norm-conforming agent than 
to an agent who violates a norm. We argue that this supports an explanation of the norm effect 
according to which it is due to a tendency to interpret statements of the form “X caused Y” or “X 




1. Research on the psychology of causal thinking has frequently revealed effects of 
normative considerations on ordinary causal attributions.2 If, for example, a professor and an 
administrative assistant each take one of the last two pens from the secretary’s desk, then 
whichever of them violated a rule against taking pens is identified more strongly as the cause of 
the secretary’s lacking a pen when she needs to record a phone call (Knobe and Fraser 2008). If 
two wires in a machine both touch a battery and thereby lead the machine to short circuit, the 
wire that was not supposed to touch the battery is identified more strongly as the cause of the 
short circuit than the wire that was supposed to touch it (Hitchcock and Knobe 2009). If two 
people simultaneously log into a computer system leading it to overload and delete an important 
file, the person who was not supposed to log in is identified more strongly as the cause of the 
file’s being deleted (Reuter et al. 2014). And so on. In each case, causal attributions seem to be 
 
1 David Rose was significantly involved in this project at an earlier stage, and we thank him for his 
important contributions. For valuable feedback we also thank two anonymous referees, Josh Knobe, and the 
members of the Florida State University Philosophical Psychology Group, especially Marshall Thompson 
and Zina Ward. 
2 By “causal attributions” we specifically mean the use of phrases like “X caused Y” or “X is the cause 
of Y” (see Sytsma et al. 2019 for further discussion). Some researchers arguably go further than this, 
asserting that norms matter for causal cognition more generally, evidence is lacking for this more general 
claim (Danks et al. 2014, Schwenkler and Sievers forthcoming). As such, in this paper we restrict our focus 
to causal attributions in the minimal sense identified here. 
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influenced by whether or not the candidate cause violated a norm. Specifically, in these cases the 
norm-violating entity is judged more strongly as the cause of what happens than the norm-
conforming entity.3 Call this the norm effect on causal attributions. 
What is the best explanation of this phenomenon? A number of counterfactual accounts 
hold that it is due to the role of normative considerations in counterfactual thinking. For example, 
on the view of Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) the abnormality of a candidate cause makes it more 
likely to be taken up in a judgment of the form “If only …” (cf. Kahneman and Tversky 1982), 
where such a judgment aims to single out what might have been changed in order to alter the 
outcome in question. Thus, for instance, in the first scenario referenced above, if the professor 
violates a rule in taking a pen but the administrative assistant does not, then the counterfactual 
expressed by (1) below is more likely to be considered in assessing what happened than is the 
counterfactual expressed by (2): 
(1) If only the professor had not taken a pen, the secretary would have had one when she 
needed it. 
 
(2) If only the administrative assistant had not taken a pen, the secretary would have had one 
when she needed it. 
 
While statements (1) and (2) are both true, the fact that the professor’s action violated a rule while 
the administrative assistant did not makes the professor’s action more salient, and thus, according 
to this account, more likely to be considered. This is supposed to explain why the professor is 
identified more strongly as the cause of the outcome.  
This kind of counterfactual account, where normative considerations impact causal 
attributions via the salience or perceived relevance of specific counterfactuals, is one of the 
 
3 In each of these cases one entity violates an injunctive norm, while the other does not. Injunctive 
norms cover both prescriptive norms (what should be done) and proscriptive norms (what should not be 
done), and while they include distinctively moral norms, they are broader than this, including conventions 
and etiquette norms, rules and laws, and norms concerning how designed systems are supposed to behave 
(norms of proper functioning). There is an ongoing debate concerning whether causal attributions are 
similarly impacted by another type of norm, descriptive or statistical norms, although we will focus on 




leading accounts in the literature.4 Not only has this account been used to explain why it would be 
useful for us to possess a concept of causation that is selective—focusing on only some causal 
candidates at the expense of others—as opposed to egalitarian (e.g., Hitchcock and Knobe 2009), 
it also has application to structural equation modeling approaches to causation. One important 
problem in these approaches is to provide some criteria for determining default and deviant 
values of variables in a model. As Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) maintain, the kind of normative 
considerations that feature in counterfactual accounts provide a criterion for setting default and 
deviant values in models (though see e.g., Blanchard and Schaffer 2017 and Livengood et al. 
2017). Moreover, the role of norms in counterfactual judgments has also been brought to bear on 
the problem of profligate causes that arises in cases of omissions (McGrath 2005). And empirical 
evidence indicates that counterfactual accounts are indeed relevant to omissions, since causal 
selection has also been found to follow norm violations in omission cases (Henne et al. 2017; but 
see Sytsma and Livengood forthcoming). 
However, another explanation of these effects is that when participants preferentially 
respond that one entity caused a certain outcome in studies like those surveyed above, they are 
expressing something akin to the judgment that the entity is the party responsible for the 
outcome. This basic type of view can be spelled out in several different ways. One division 
centers on how broad the underlying phenomenon is taken to be. Taking the phenomenon to be 
relatively narrow, one possibility is that the dominant use of causal attributions (i.e., statements of 
the form “X caused Y” or “X is the cause of Y”) is to express purely descriptive judgments, but 
that something about the set-up of the empirical studies at issue generates pragmatic 
considerations that lead participants to instead take the experimenters to be asking for a normative 
judgment.5 Taking the phenomenon to be relatively broad, however, an alternative possibility is 
 
4 See, e.g., Hitchcock and Knobe 2009, Halpern and Hitchcock 2015, Kominsky et al. 2015, Icard et al. 
2017, Kominsky and Phillips 2019. 
5 See Samland and Waldmann (2016), Samland et al. (2016). 
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that the dominant use of causal attributions is not purely descriptive, but has a normative 
component.6 On this type of view, statements of the form “X caused Y” or “X is the cause of Y” 
typically serve to indicate something more than that someone or something contributed to the 
outcome or brought about the outcome: they also express a normative evaluation, just as 
statements like “The professor is the one responsible for the problem” or “The professor is the 
one accountable for the problem” intuitively do. Our purpose in this paper is not to lay out the full 
range of possibilities here, nor to adjudicate between these competing positions; rather our focus 
is on the dispute between these views and those according to which the norm effect arises 
indirectly from the influence of normative considerations on counterfactual thinking.7 As such 
we’ll refer to these alternative positions jointly as responsibility accounts. According to these 
responsibility accounts, what explains the norm effect is the fact that, at least in these 
experimental conditions, causal attributions are used by participants to express a normative 
judgment, i.e., one that assigns responsibility for the outcome in question. 
In this paper we critically reconsider one type of evidence that has been put forward in 
favor of counterfactual accounts and against responsibility accounts. Advocates of counterfactual 
accounts hold that what matters for causal attributions in cases like those surveyed above is only 
that a norm was violated, not that the subsequent outcome was bad. Because of this, these 
accounts yield the prediction that the same effect would be seen if the outcome was instead good. 
Hitchcock and Knobe make this prediction explicitly: they note that on their view what matters 
for causal attributions are not judgments about the valence of the effect, but “judgments about 
whether the candidate cause was itself a norm violation” (2009, p. 603). Since it is only the norm 
violation that matters, they predict that the valence of the outcome should make no difference to 
 
6 See, e.g., Sytsma et al. (2012), Livengood et al. (2017), Sytsma et al. (2019), Livengood and Sytsma 
(2020), Sytsma and Livengood (forthcoming), Sytsma (forthcoming). 
7 These do not exhaust the accounts that have been put forward in the literature. Most notably, Alicke 
and colleagues have argued that the norm effect is due to people’s desire to blame (or praise) the targeted 
entity biasing their application of what is otherwise a purely descriptive concept (see Alicke 1992, 2000; 
Alicke et al. 2011; Rose 2017).  
 5 
 
the direction of the effect. Specifically, they predict that if a good outcome were brought about 
instead of a bad outcome, “the impact of normative considerations should remain unchanged 
(because people still see that a norm has been violated)” (ibid.). 
To test this prediction, Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) gave participants the following Drug 
Case, in which two agents jointly bring about a good outcome: 
An intern is taking care of a patient in a hospital. The intern notices that the patient is 
having some kidney problems. Recently, the intern read a series of studies about a new 
drug that can alleviate problems like this one, and he decides to administer the drug in 
this case. 
 
Before the intern can administer the drug, he needs to get the signature of the pharmacist 
(to confirm that the hospital has enough in stock) and the signature of the attending 
doctor (to confirm that the drug is appropriate for this patient). So he sends off requests to 
both the pharmacist and the attending doctor. 
 
The pharmacist receives the request, checks to see that they have enough in stock, and 
immediately signs off. 
 
The attending doctor receives the request at the same time and immediately realizes that 
there are strong reasons to refuse. Although some studies show that the drug can help 
people with kidney problems, there are also a number of studies showing that the drug can 
have very dangerous side effects. For this reason, the hospital has a policy forbidding the 
use of this drug for kidney problems. Despite this policy, the doctor decides to sign off. 
Since both signatures were received, the patient is administered the drug. As it happens, 
the patient immediately recovers, and the drug has no adverse effects. 
 
After reading this vignette, participants rated their agreement with a causal attribution concerning 
either the attending doctor (“The attending doctor’s decision caused the patient’s recovery”) or 
the pharmacist (“The pharmacist’s decision caused the patient’s recovery”). Hitchcock and Knobe 
found evidence of the norm effect: ratings were significantly higher for the attending doctor 
(M=3.9) than for the pharmacist (M=2.5). And they take this finding to support their 
counterfactual account over its competitors. 
 But there are several damning confounds in Hitchcock and Knobe’s presentation of this 
case. First, it could be partly because of the greater degree of responsibility that a doctor, as 
opposed to a pharmacist, has in respect of a patient’s care that the doctor’s decision is identified 
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more strongly as the cause of a patient’s recovery. Second, it could also be due to the greater 
number of words devoted to describing the doctor’s decision that the doctor’s role is treated as 
more causally significant. Third, and most importantly for our purposes, while in Hitchcock and 
Knobe’s Drug Case it is clear that the attending doctor violates hospital policy, it is not explicitly 
stated why the doctor does this. The vignette notes that some studies indicate that the drug might 
help the patient, while others indicate that it might harm the patient. The implication is that the 
attending doctor is aware of the evidence and is making a difficult decision, presumably guided 
by the details of the patient’s specific case and motivated by a desire to help the patient. In other 
words, it is not implausible to take the attending doctor to be choosing to uphold a higher norm—
the duty of doctors to help their patients—that is in conflict with official policy. Insofar as the 
attending doctor made a difficult decision in the face of conflicting evidence, while the 
pharmacist simply checked the stock of the drug, it seems that despite violating hospital policy, 
the doctor is more deserving of credit for the patient’s recovery than is the pharmacist. Following 
this reasoning, responsibility accounts, like Hitchcock and Knobe’s counterfactual account, yield 
the prediction that the attending doctor will be judged more strongly as the cause of the patient’s 
recovery than the pharmacist. In short, Hitchcock and Knobe’s results for the Drug Case do not in 
fact distinguish between the counterfactual and responsibility accounts. 
 
2. To test the hypothesis that the effect observed in the Drug Case reflects a tendency to 
regard the attending doctor as more deserving of credit for the patient’s eventual recovery, we ran 
a simple study. Participants were given Hitchcock and Knobe’s original Drug Case vignette, then 
asked to rate the following two statements concerning who deserves credit for the patient’s 
recovery using a 7-point scale anchored at 1 with “Strongly disagree,” at 4 with “Neither agree 
nor disagree,” and at 7 with “Strongly agree”: 
The attending doctor deserves credit for the patient’s recovery. 
 




The vignette was then repeated on a second page and participants were asked to rate two causal 
attributions using the same 7-point scale as on the first page: 
The attending doctor caused the patient’s recovery. 
 
The pharmacist caused the patient’s recovery. 
 
Participants were not able to return to the first page. The order of the questions on the first page 
was randomized and the questions on the second page were presented in that same order. 
Participants for each study in this paper were recruited through advertising for a free 
personality test on Google with the ads displaying in North America.8 Responses were restricted 
to participants who indicated that they are native English speakers, 16 years of age or older, with 
at most minimal training in philosophy, and who had not previously participated in the study.9 
For Study 1, responses were collected from 77 participants who met the restrictions.10 The results 
are shown in Figure 1. 
We made three predictions concerning Study 1: first, that the effect found by Hitchcock 
and Knobe would also be found for ratings of how much credit each agent deserves; second, that 
the effect would replicate for the causal attributions on the second page; and third, that the effect 
for credit judgments would fully mediate the effect for causal attributions (i.e., the effect for 
causal attributions would no longer be significant when controlling for the effect on credit 
judgments). All three predictions were borne out. 
 
8 The personality test was administered after the target questions. One notable benefit of using a “push 
strategy” like this one (i.e., recruiting participants who were not directly looking to participate in research) 
is that participants are more likely to be “experimentally naïve” and less likely to be motivated to provide 
the responses that they think the experimenters are looking for (Haug 2018). Samples collected using the 
recruitment strategy employed here have been previously compared against samples collected with other 
methods in replication studies. And the present strategy has been consistently found to generate a diverse 
sample in terms of geography, socio-economic status, religiosity, political orientation, age, and education. 
Studies using this strategy have been previously reported in publications including, e.g., Sytsma (2010, 
2012), Feltz and Cokely (2011), Murray et al. (2013), Reuter et al. (2014, 2019), Machery et al. (2015), 
Livengood and Rose (2016), Kim et al. (2016), Sytsma and Ozdemir (2019), Fischer et al. (forthcoming). 
9 Participants were counted as having more than minimal training in philosophy if they had completed 
an undergraduate major or more advanced studies. 




Figure 1: Results for Study 1. Plots on the left show relative percentage of participants selecting 
each response option, with means and 95% confidence intervals overlaid. Scatterplots on the right 
show points with jitter and regression lines calculated without jitter. 
 
A two-way ANOVA with agent (Doctor, Pharmacist) and attribution (Credit, Cause) as 
within-subjects factors showed a significant main effect for agent and no further significant 
effects, although there was a borderline significant interaction (Table 1). In line with this, planned 
t-tests revealed the expected effect for both credit judgments, confirming our first prediction, and 
causal attributions, confirming our second prediction: specifically, in each set of questions ratings 
were higher for the doctor than for the pharmacist.11 There was also a strong correlation between 
the ratings, as is clear from the scatterplots in Figure 1.12  
 
Predictor dfNum  dfDen    SSNum   SSDen      F  p η2g  
(Intercept) 1 76 4007.54 523.21 582.12 .000 .80 
agent 1 76 88.39 222.36 30.21 .000 .08 
attribution 1 76 0.73 154.02 0.36 .550 .00 
agent x attribution 1 76 3.12 71.63 3.31 .073 .00 
 
Table 1: Results of ANOVA for Study 1. 
 
To test our third prediction, we performed a Bayesian within-subjects mediation analysis 
with 10k iterations (Vuorre and Bolger 2018), testing whether participants’ credit judgments 
 
11 Credit: t(76)=5.54, p<.001, d=.63. Cause: t(76)=3.99, p<.001, d=.45. 
12 r=.57, t(152)=8.54, p<.001 
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mediated the effect on causal attributions. We found that the effect of agent on Credit fully 
mediated the effect on Cause, as seen on the left in Figure 2: the effect is no longer significant 
when controlling for credit judgments. By contrast, as seen on the right in Figure 2, the reverse 
analysis shows that while the effect of agent on Cause mediated the effect on Credit, it mediated a 
notably smaller proportion of the effect, and the effect remained significant when controlling for 
causal attributions. 
 
Figure 2: Results for mediation analyses for norm effects in Study 1, showing path diagrams with 
point estimates (posterior means) of the parameters, with standard errors, and associated 95% 
credible intervals, as well as the estimated direct effect, mediation effect (ME), and proportion of 
the effect mediated (PME). 
 
The results of Study 1 suggest that the “norm effect” found by Hitchcock and Knobe 
(2009) for the Drug Case in fact reflects people’s judgments that the attending doctor is more 
deserving of credit for the patient’s recovery than the pharmacist. This is directly in line with the 
predictions of responsibility accounts. Thus, at worst, the previous findings for the Drug Case do 
not support counterfactual accounts over responsibility accounts. But arguably the results for 
Study 1 go further than this, for they raise doubts about whether we are truly dealing with the 
suggested norm effect in the first place. That is, insofar as the results indicate that the effect for 
causal attributions is explained by participants’ judgments that the doctor is more deserving of 
credit, it seems that the effect is not specifically due to the doctor’s having violated a norm. If 
anything, following the reasoning above, it would seem that the doctor is more deserving of credit 
not because she violated hospital policy, but because she followed a higher norm, using her best 
judgment in an attempt to help her patient.  
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3. How might we construct a case that would distinguish more effectively between the 
predictions of counterfactual accounts and responsibility accounts? Most obviously, the agents in 
the case need to be such that their roles in bringing about the outcome are more exactly equal, and 
are described in approximately equal detail. Moreover, it needs to be clear from the description of 
the case that while the norm-violating agent does not deserve credit for bringing about the good 
outcome, the norm-conforming agent does. In such a case, counterfactual accounts would 
continue to predict that the norm-violating agent will be identified more strongly as the cause, 
since it is only the norm violation that matters. By contrast, responsibility accounts predict that in 
such a case the norm effect will be reversed: the norm-conforming agent will now be identified 
more strongly as the cause, since it is she who is more deserving of credit.  
To test these predictions, we began by adapting the Drug Case to make the agents’ 
motivations clearer. In our modified vignette, two physicians sign off on the request to treat a 
patient with a certain drug, with one of them clearly violating a norm in doing so while the other 
clearly does not. In line with the above reasoning, we specified that the norm-violating doctor 
(Dr. Smith) signs off on the request for a bad reason, with no concern for how this would impact 
the patient. This is contrasted with a norm-conforming doctor (Dr. Patel) who signs off on the 
request for a good reason, believing that the drug will help the patient. The revised vignette reads 
as follows: 
An intern is taking care of a patient in a hospital. The intern notices that the patient is 
having some kidney problems. The intern knows that a certain drug is often administered 
for kidney problems like these, and he thinks it might be good to administer the drug in 
this case. 
 
Before the intern can administer the drug, he needs to get the signatures of the two 
attending physicians, Dr. Smith and Dr. Patel. So he sends off requests to both of them. 
Although the drug is often administered in the hospital, hospital policy nonetheless 
requires attending physicians to carefully consider a patient’s file, including information 
about their condition and medical history, before signing off on the administration of any 
drug. 
 
Dr. Patel receives the request. He is aware that many studies show that the drug can help 
people with kidney problems, but that there are also some studies showing that the drug 
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can have dangerous side effects depending on the patient’s medical history. Dr. Patel 
reviews the patient’s file and realizes that the situation is complicated: the patient has 
some indicators of increased risk for side effects, but not others. After carefully 
reviewing the evidence, however, Dr. Patel concludes that the balance of considerations 
point in favor of administering the drug, and so he decides to sign off on the request. 
 
Dr. Smith receives the request at the same time. Like Dr. Patel, he is aware that many 
studies show that the drug can help people with kidney problems, but that there are also 
some studies showing that the drug can have dangerous side effects depending on the 
patient’s medical history. But Dr. Smith does not bother to review the patient’s file and, 
thus, is ignorant of the patient’s medical history. Dr. Smith has a close relationship with 
the pharmaceutical company that manufactures this drug and gets a kick-back every time 
he approves the drug, so he decides to sign off on the request for that reason. 
 
Since both signatures are received, the patient is administered the drug. 
 
As it happens, the patient’s condition immediately improves, and the drug has no adverse 
side effects. 
 
Our second study followed the first, using a two-page design with participants being asked to rate 
a pair of statements on each page using the same scale as before. This time, on the first page 
participants rated the following pair of causal attributions: 
Dr. Patel caused the patient’s condition to improve. 
 
Dr. Smith caused the patient’s condition to improve. 
 
In addition, after the causal attributions participants were given a check question asking them, 
“How many attending physicians needed to sign off on the request to administer the drug?” On 
the second page, participants then rated the following pair of responsibility attributions: 
 Dr. Patel is responsible for the patient’s condition improving. 
 
Dr. Smith is responsible for the patient’s condition improving. 
 
As before, the order of the questions was randomized, the vignette was repeated on the second 
page, and participants were not able to go back to the first page after proceeding. Responses were 
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collected from 73 participants who met the restrictions and passed the check question.13 The 
results are shown in Figure 3. 
 As we have seen, counterfactual accounts predict that causal ratings for Dr. Smith will be 
significantly higher than for Dr. Patel. After all, it is Dr. Patel who conforms with the relevant 
norms, while Dr. Smith not only violates the hospital’s policy, but violates clear ethical norms in 
signing off on the request for purposes of receiving a kick-back. By contrast, responsibility 
accounts make the opposite prediction: they predict that causal ratings for Dr. Patel will be 
significantly higher than for Dr. Smith, since Dr. Patel is more deserving of credit for the 
patient’s condition improving. Further, responsibility accounts predict that we will see the same 
general effect for responsibility attributions that we expect to find for causal attributions. The 
results of Study 2 ran counter to the prediction of counterfactual accounts, while both predictions 




Figure 3: Results for Study 2. Plots on the left show relative percentage of participants selecting 
each response option, with means and 95% confidence intervals overlaid. Scatterplots on the right 
show points with jitter and regression lines calculated without jitter. 
 
A two-way ANOVA with agent (Patel, Smith) and attribution (Cause, Responsible) as 
within-subjects factors showed a significant main effect for agent and no further effects (Table 2). 
 
13 2/75 (2.6%) of participants missed the check question. The remaining participants were 73.6% 
women (one non-binary) and had an average age of 50.2 years (16-84). 
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The lack of significant effects for attribution supports the second prediction of responsibility 
accounts.14 Planned t-tests revealed that against the prediction of counterfactual accounts, and in 
line with that of responsibility accounts, the norm effect was reversed for the causal attributions, 
with ratings being higher for the norm-conforming agent (Dr. Patel) than for the norm-violating 
agent (Dr. Smith).15 And, again in line with the prediction of responsibility accounts, the norm 
effect was also reversed for responsibility attributions.16 Further, there was a strong correlation 
between ratings for Cause and Responsible, as is clear from the scatterplots in Figure 3.17  
 
Predictor dfNum  dfDen    SSNum   SSDen      F  p η2g  
(Intercept) 1 72 5189.59 471.16 793.05 .000 .85 
agent 1 72 95.51 248.24 27.70 .000 .10 
attribution 1 72 0.99 97.76 0.73 .396 .00 
agent x attribution 1 72 0.03 79.72 0.03 .868 .00 
 
Table 2: Results of ANOVA for Study 2. 
 
The findings for Study 2 are readily explained by responsibility accounts but are quite 
problematic for counterfactual accounts. Most importantly, we find the reverse effect of that 
predicted by counterfactual accounts for causal attributions: participants identified the norm-
conforming agent more strongly as the cause of the patient’s recovery. Following the above 
discussion, the most natural explanation is that participants were inclined to give Dr. Patel credit 
 
14 The finding that ratings for causal attributions and responsibility attributions are not statistically 
significantly distinguishable is in line with previous studies (e.g., Sytsma forthcoming) and, arguably, 
supports the responsibility view put forward by Sytsma and Livengood over the pragmatic view put 
forward by Samland and Waldmann and the bias view put forward by Alicke and colleagues. While the 
former treats the dominant use of causal attributions as expressing a normative concept akin to 
responsibility, and so expects a close correspondence between causal attributions and responsibility 
attributions in cases like this, the latter views hold that pragmatic features or bias are leading some 
participants astray. As such, while these views would predict similar effects for causal attributions and 
responsibility attributions, they would not predict the close correspondence observed here as this would 
suggest an unrealistically strong pragmatic or bias effect. See Livengood and Sytsma (2020) and Sytsma 
(forthcoming) for discussion.  
15 t(72)=4.87, p<.001, d=.57 
16 t(72)=4.32, p<.001, d=.51 
17 r=.64, t(144)=10.06, p<.001 
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for the patient’s improvement because he deliberated over the patient’s case in the way that he 
was supposed to do. As such, the reverse effect is in keeping with responsibility accounts. 
 
4. The counterfactual account proposed by Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) has subsequently 
been developed in a number of papers, including by Kominsky et al. (2015). There they explore a 
further effect that they term “causal superseding.” The details need not concern us here; what is 
important for present purposes is that Kominsky et al. make a similar prediction to Hitchcock and 
Knobe concerning the impact of outcome valence. As they write, “from the standpoint of the 
counterfactual account, the relevant component is the norm violation of the superseding actor, not 
the valence of the outcome” (2009, p. 199).  
In Kominsky et al.’s second experiment they tested a different case—the Computer 
Case—involving a good outcome. The vignette for the relevant condition reads as follows: 
Billy and Suzy work for the same company. They work in different rooms and both of 
them sometimes need to access the central computer of the company. Nobody at the 
company is aware that if two people are logged into the central computer at the same 
time, some spam e-mails containing dangerous viruses are immediately deleted from the 
central computer. 
 
In order to make sure that one person is always available to answer incoming phone calls, 
the company issued the following official policy: Suzy is the only one permitted to log 
into the central computer in the mornings, whereas Billy is the only one permitted to log 
into the central computer in the afternoons. Billy is not permitted to log into the central 
computer in the morning. 
 
Today at 9am, Billy and Suzy both log into the central computer at the same time. 
Immediately, some work e-mails containing dangerous viruses are deleted from the 
central computer.  
 
On a first page, participants rated a pair of causal attributions on a seven-point scale—one stating 
that Billy caused the outcome, the other that Suzy caused the outcome. While Kominsky et al. do 
not report the individual means for this condition, it is clear from their Figure 3 that the norm 
effect occurred, with ratings being notably higher for Billy than for Suzy.  
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 However, as with Hitchcock and Knobe’s original Drug Case, it would be a mistake to use 
the Computer Case as a way of testing counterfactual accounts against responsibility accounts, 
since it simply is not clear what responsibility accounts should predict about judgments concerning 
this case. For since neither Billy nor Suzy knew about the issue with the central computer, neither 
could have logged in with the intention of thereby bringing about the deletion of the emails 
containing the dangerous viruses. As such, the reasoning applied for the revised Drug Case does 
not apply to the Computer Case, since Suzy seems not to deserve any credit for the unforeseen 
good outcome of her act. Following the results from the previous study, however, we predicted 
that the norm effect would again be reversed if it was specified that Suzy acted specifically for the 
purpose of deleting the dangerous viruses, while Billy acted for an alternative, malicious reason.  
To test this prediction, in our third study we gave participants a revised version of the 
Computer Case in which the motives of both agents are now explicitly noted. The revised 
vignette reads as follows: 
Billy and Suzy work for the same company. They work in different rooms and both of 
them sometimes need to access the company’s central computer.  
 
As a safety procedure to ensure that important files aren’t lost, company policy requires 
that in order for a file to be deleted from the central computer, two employees must mark 
the file for deletion. Only some employees are allowed to mark files for deletion. Suzy is 
allowed to mark files for deletion, but Billy is not allowed to mark files for deletion. 
 
This morning, Billy and Suzy both marked the same file for deletion at the exact same 
time. 
 
Suzy had looked carefully at the metadata for the file and came to the considered 
conclusion that the file contained a dangerous computer virus. She marked the file for 
deletion in order to remove the virus. 
 
Billy had looked at the name of the file, and based on the name concluded that the file 
contained financial records that would reveal that he’s been embezzling money from the 
company. So Billy marked the file for deletion in order to remove the incriminating 
evidence.   
 
Since two employees had both marked the file for deletion, the file was immediately 
deleted from the central computer. As it turns out, the deleted file contained an extremely 




The approach of Study 3 followed the first two, using a two-page design with participants being 
asked to rate a pair of statements on each page using the same scale as before. As in the previous 
study, on the first page participants rated a pair of causal attributions: 
Billy caused the file containing the dangerous virus to be deleted. 
 
Suzy caused the file containing the dangerous virus to be deleted. 
 
After the causal attributions participants were again given a check question: “How many people 
needed to mark the file for deletion for it to be deleted?” On the second page participants then 
rated a pair of responsibility attributions: 
Billy is responsible for the file containing the dangerous virus being deleted. 
 
Suzy is responsible for file containing the dangerous virus being deleted. 
 
As before, the order of the questions was randomized, the vignette was repeated on the second 
page, and participants were not able to go back to the first page after proceeding. Responses were 
collected from 104 participants who met the restrictions and passed the check question.18 The 
results are shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Results for Study 3. Plots on the left show relative percentage of participants selecting 
each response option, with means and 95% confidence intervals overlaid. Scatterplots on the right 
show points with jitter and regression lines calculated without jitter. 
 
18 17/121 (14.0%) of participants missed the check question. The remaining participants were 75.0% 
women (one non-binary) and had an average age of 53.3 years (16-86). 
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 As with the previous study, counterfactual accounts predict that causal ratings for Billy 
should be significantly higher than for Suzy, since Billy violated company policy (in addition to 
ethical and legal norms in attempting to destroy incriminating evidence), while Suzy did not. By 
contrast, responsibility accounts again make the opposite prediction: causal ratings for Suzy 
should be significantly higher than for Billy, since Suzy is more deserving of credit for the 
dangerous virus being deleted. Further, responsibility accounts predict that we will see the same 
effect for responsibility attributions that we expect to find for causal attributions. The results of 
our experiment again ran counter to the prediction of counterfactual accounts, and were in line 
with those of responsibility accounts instead. 
A two-way ANOVA with agent (Suzy, Billy) and attribution (Cause, Responsible) as 
within-subjects factors again showed a significant main effect for agent and no further effects 
(Table 3). The lack of significant effects for attribution supports the second prediction of 
responsibility accounts. Planned t-tests revealed that, as predicted by responsibility accounts but 
not by counterfactual accounts, the norm effect was again reversed for the causal attributions, 
with ratings being higher for the norm-conforming agent (Suzy) than for the norm-violating agent 
(Billy).19 And, in line with the second prediction of responsibility accounts, the norm effect was 
also reversed for the responsibility attributions.20 Further, there was once again a strong 
correlation between ratings for Cause and Responsible, as is clear from the scatterplots.21  
 
Predictor dfNum  dfDen    SSNum   SSDen      F  p η2g  
(Intercept) 1 103 7344.96 1025.04 738.05 .000 .78 
agent 1 103 100.04 660.96 15.59 .000 .05 
attribution 1 103 0.04 140.96 0.03 .867 .00 
agent x attribution 1 103 0.00 258.00 0.00    1.00 .00 
 





19 t(103)=3.39, p<.001, d=.33 
20 t(103)=3.31, p<.001, d=.32 
21 r=.64, t(206)=11.80, p<.001 
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Study 3 replicated the findings from Study 2 with a second case from the literature. As in 
the previous study, we found the reverse effect of that predicted by counterfactual accounts for 
causal attributions. This puts further pressure on counterfactual accounts, while again lining up 
with the predictions of responsibility accounts. 
 
5. Daniel Kahneman (2011, 133) writes that “the proof that you truly understand a pattern 
of behavior is that you know how to reverse it.”22 In this paper we reversed an important effect 
found in the literature on the impact of norms on causal attributions. Advocates of counterfactual 
accounts have taken the occurrence of the norm effect for cases with good outcomes to offer 
strong support for their accounts while providing evidence against responsibility accounts. Based 
on insights from responsibility accounts, however, we suggested an alternative explanation of the 
effect. This explanation was supported by the results of our first study. We then called on this 
explanation to predict when the effect would be reversed. And, indeed, the reverse effect was 
found for two different vignettes in our second and third studies. These studies provide strong 
evidence against counterfactual accounts. And, if Kahneman is right and the proof that you 
understand an effect is seen in the ability to reverse it, these studies provide equally strong 
evidence in favor of responsibility accounts. 
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